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MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 
GEORGE H. DESSIONt 
LAST May the Supreme Court of the United States once again entered 
what has been described as "a vast arena . . . filled with special interests 
which conflict and contradict and clamor."' This is the scene of local 
government defaults- and of the struggles and negotiations to which they 
give rise. Their frequency and wide geographical distribution since 1926 
have become common knowledge.2 Our institutional unpreparedness to 
cope with such situations in a manner wholly compatible with the 
public interest has likewise been demonstrated. Not that this unpre- 
paredness should have been news; but so few were the defaults between 
1900 and 1926 that this particular field of controversy with its sui generis 
playing rules and tactics had until 1926 been but a colorful legend handed 
down to a relatively small group of legal and financial specialists in mu- 
nicipal bonds by their forbears. 
It was a legend replete with stories of how local government units 
over-burdened with debt invoked every possible technicality against the 
validity of their outstanding obligations; of mandamus decrees obtained 
by creditors but rendered ineffective by local officials who had been 
elected with the understanding that they would spend their entire period 
of office in jail or in evading federal marshals; and of utterly fantastic 
state legislation enacted time and again as a last resort to bring creditors 
to their knees. Not a few participants emerged with the conclusion that 
* . . Up to now the judicial process as applied to the settlement of 
the claims of the creditors of insolvent municipalities has had very little 
more tendency to attain a correct result than the common law trial by 
battle,"3 and that such situations were "not subject to control or man- 
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agement according to any known law, except the first law of nature 
. . . " 4 But the generally- if superficially-tranquil state of mu- 
nicipal credit during the first quarter of the present century effectively 
obscured what might otherwise have been provocative experiences. Even 
when the Florida municipalities began to default following the col- 
lapse of the Florida land boom in 1926 it was generally agreed that 
"What was happening down there . . . could never happen in such 
regions as North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, or Illinois."5 
But as it became apparent that, after all, such things could happen, 
and were happening, not only in the states just mentioned but in a great 
many others, the legend. speedily came to life. Experiences of the past 
were recapitulated and almost at once began to provoke legislative 
experiments in ways and means of devising more satisfactory govern- 
mental debt adjustment mechanisms. Two of these experiments have 
recently been involved in litigation before the Supreme Court. One 
elicited but a memorandum denial of certiorari of somewhat indetermin- 
ate import.' The other, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve- 
mient District No. 17 squarely divided the Court five to four and elicited 
a majority opinion so forthright and sweeping in its terms that it must 
constitute a major premise in almost any subsequent considerations of 
the municipal debt adjustment problem as a whole. It is, therefore, 
the purpose of this article, conceived as an introductory sketch, to analyze 
what the Court has done and to attempt to forecast the extent to which 
it may be said to have narrowed or transformed the problem of ways 
and means. 
1. 
By 1932, extended negotiations between representatives of a debtor 
taxing district and of its creditors had already taken place in a great 
many situations. In not a few of them a complete plan for the read- 
justment and refunding of the indebtedness in question had been pre- 
pared, enabling legislation enacted, and assents to the plan obtained from 
a great majority of the creditors as well as of the debtor. But at this 
point a common obstacle to the consummation of many such plans cropped 
up" and prompted the legislative experiment to which this article is 
addressed. With respect to the practical seriousness of this obstacle, how- 
ever, and likewise the stress appropriate to be placed upon it in any 
4. Id. at 42. 
5. Shanks, The Extent of Mllunicipal Defaults (1935) 24 NAT. MUN. REv. 32. 
6. City of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. 
deified, 296 U. S. 624 (1936), (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702. 
7. 56 Sup. Ct. 892 (1936). 
8. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Commnittee on the Judiciary 
on S. x868 and H. R. 5950, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934); Hearings before the House 
Comtmittee on the Judiciary ont H. R. 1670, etc., 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). 
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consideration of ways and means toward the promotion of order, fair- 
ness and economy in debt readjustment, there has been and still is a 
difference of opinion among specialists. The obstacle in question was 
the one emphasized by Mr. Justice Cardozo in his minority opinion in 
the Ashton case: "Experience makes it certain that generally there will 
be at least a small minority of creditors who will resist a composition, 
however fair and reasonable, if the law does not subject them to a pres- 
sure to obey the general will."' The majority of the Court, possibly 
reflecting the difference of opinion adverted to, did not discuss the ob- 
stacle in question. 
Clearing up a local government default ordinarily resolves itself in the 
end, as is often the case where a private debtor defaults, into a process 
of negotiation culminating in settlement by compromise. For, barring 
exceptional cases of outright repudiation by a local government unit 
entirely able to pay, litigation by creditors is but ancillary to this main 
process of extra-judicial negotiation. This is not to say that litigation 
is infrequent or futile.'0 To reason thus would be to take it for granted 
that the debtor is always right and that the stage is always set for fair- 
minded and peaceable compromise. The fact is that where a debtor is 
disposed to question the legal validity of its obligations, proves unre- 
ceptive to negotiation, or where negotiations once entered into break 
down at any stage, creditors may find resort to litigation their sole 
weapon. In a like manner, threatened diversions of funds earmarked for 
debt service or resort to diverse illegal fiscal practices to the prejudice 
of creditors have been known to call for judicial restraint through man- 
damus or the injunction. Mandamus to reach a fund or to require a tax 
levy may also be necessary to prevent the obtaining of an unwarranted 
preference in fact by other creditors. 
But in cases of factual insolvency as distinguished from outright re- 
pudiation, which is to say cases wherein the debtor taxing district cannot 
as a matter of fact raise or be made to raise funds sufficient to meet its 
obligations as they mature, there is no magic in mandamus or any other 
available judicial writ or decree which will enable the creditors as a 
whole to collect their due. Attachment and garnishment as methods 
for enforcing the payment of such claims may, save in New England," 
9. 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 900 (1936). 
10. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 18 et seq. 
11. In New England the creditor of a town or other quasi-public corporation, and 
in some instances of a city, enjoys a unique remedy available nowhere else in the United 
States, namely, the possibility of obtaining execution against the private property of 
inhabitants of the debtor taxing district to satisfy a judgment against the latter. ME. 
REv. STAT. (1930) c. 98, ? 30; Id. c. 56, ? 116; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 346, ? 8; 
VT. PUB. LAWS (1934) ? 2253; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368, 41 Am. Dec. 148 
(1844); Nichols v. Ansonia, 81 Conn. 229, 70 Atl. 636 (1908); Chase v. Merrimack 
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be dismissed from practical consideration except for a few exceptional 
situations."2 For, by specific legislative provision in some jurisdictions 
and by decision in others, the property of a public corporation presently 
devoted to a public use and appropriate to that end is exempt from such 
levies. Nor have either the state or federal courts acquiesced in the 
occasional prayers of litigants that private property within a debtor sub- 
division be applied to the payment of its debts on some equitable theory13 
or otherwise than through the indirect and cumbersome procedure of 
taxation and tax collection. Both federal'4 and state'5 courts have, 
moreover, been deemed to lack power to appoint a receiver for an in- 
solvent local political subdivision of a state in the absence of state legis- 
lation construed specifically to authorize such a course of action.16 
Whatever the atmosphere and episodes of the interim preceding the 
stage at which the parties affected have been brought to a settling frame 
of mind, the ultimate recourse of the creditors in case of insolvency, 
therefore, must be to negotiation of a plan of readjustment with the 
debtor and with one another. In some instances a general extension of 
outstanding maturities by endorsement may suffice. More often an ex- 
change of new refunding securities for the old will be the method 
deemed most practicable, for the chances are that an insolvent taxing 
district will be unable to raise new money by the sale of refunding 
securities after default. In the case of drainage, levee, irrigation and 
similar special districts, however, readjustment has in some instances 
been accomplished through the medium of a loan from the Reconstruc- 
tion Finance Corporation. The loan is employed to buy up all out- 
standing bonds and other obligations of the given district, usually at 
some discount, and such securities or an uncancelled fraction thereof are 
then pledged as collateral for the loan'7 and eventually exchanged for 
new refunding securities. 
But whatever be the form of readjustment attempted its basis is 
contractual and voluntary. There is nothing to prevent a dissenter from 
retaining his old securities. Suppose that the majority were to proceed 
with an exchange of their old securities for refunding securities pursuant 
to a readjustment plan. Such a plan, if it is to be acceptable to many 
Bank, 19 Pick. 564 (Mass. 1837); Legis. (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1318; S. E. C., 
op. cit. supra note 2, at 17. 
12. Fordham, Mfethods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligationis of Public Corpora- 
tionis (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 28, et seq.; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 962 
et seq. 
13. Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1873). 
14. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880). 
15. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 104. 
16. Cf. Supervisors of Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1868); Guardian 
Savings and Trust Co. v. Road Improvement District, 267 U. S. 1 (1925). 
17. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 26-27. 
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of the creditors, must be based upon the debtor's apparent capacity to 
pay, which is to say that it must be based upon the utmost in taxes 
and other revenues available for the purpose to the debtor. But a dis- 
senter still retaining his old securities and therefore having made none 
of the sacrifices presumably involved in acceptance of the plan-whether 
merely in the form of a postponement of maturities or an actual scaling 
of principal or interest-could demand payment according to the terms 
of his original contract and, if refused, obtain a judgment and writ of 
mandamus for the levy of taxes to satisfy his claim. 
Should the holdings of dissenters consist of already past due or pre- 
sently maturing principal in any substantial amount---even though its 
percentage of the total outstanding be small-their disruptive possi- 
bilities are obvious.18 To pay them might very conceivably involve a 
doubling or even trebling of the tax levy for debt service contemplated by 
the plan for a particular fiscal year. Conceivably, this might precipitate 
new default. Even where the dissenters' holdings are less likely in terms 
of amount and maturities to disrupt the new fiscal arrangements em- 
bodied in the plan their nuisance value may still be serious. Holders 
otherwise inclined to participate in the plan may resent the possibility 
of more favorable treatment for dissenters. A committee for creditors 
may quite naturally feel that to yield in one situation will encourage 
hold-outs in others in which their members or affiliates are similarly 
interested. The net result is that the consummation of a readjustment 
plan usually has to be conditioned on the participation of a very great 
majority, if not of substantially all, of. the creditors affected. 
The past few years yield numerous instances where settlements ac- 
ceptable to an overwhelming majority were considerably delayed, if 
not upset completely, by relatively infinitesimal minorities." The differ- 
ence of opinion with respect to the importance of minority obstruction 
in these cases puts in issue, therefore, not so much the existence or fre- 
quency of such obstruction as the relative appropriateness of the several 
views now current as to what the problem is and what should be done 
about it. 
First of all, there is the view that "where a substantial majority agree 
upon a refunding, a way is usually found to bring in the dissenters"',20 
and there is much to support this contention-up to a point. For the 
non-depositing or non-participating creditor confronted with a power- 
fully backed committee has a rather unsatisfactory choice; competing 
committees are so rare as to be virtually non-existent in the municipal 
18. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 27-30. 
19. See the instance cited in the Senate and House hearings on the Sumner-Wilcox 
Act, supra note 8. 
20. Dimock and Frye, Book Review (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 186, 188. 
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field. The alternative to deposit under such circumstances is likely to 
mean an absence of any practicable remedy against the debtor taxing 
district in addition to an indefinite and unprofitable delay. Once a com- 
mittee has negotiated a plan with the debtor and obtained the deposit 
or other participation of a substantial majority of obligations outstand- 
ing, it is safe to assume that the officials of the debtor will cooperate 
with the committee to bring in the needed additional participants. A 
variety of "bearing down" tactics and devices may be employed. 
In negotiating interim agreements with the debtor, and in particular 
agreements for the payment over of such sums on account of interest 
as the debtor may have on hand from time to time, a committee natur- 
ally acts only for the benefit of creditors who have deposited or entered 
into participation agreements with it. Non-depositors are not given a 
"free ride". A pointed example. of such tactics on the part of a com- 
mittee with the cooperation of its debtor city is afforded in the Coral 
Gables, Florida, case. There the committee and the city arranged to 
"keep the city in the red" so that non-participants would be shut out 
from any revenues available for creditors in the near future. The ar- 
rangement is discussed in the following testimony before the Securities 
and Exchange Commission by Mayor Vincent D. Wyman of Coral 
Gables and Committee Chairman Edwin H. Barker: 
"Q. In the minutes of your committee of July 23, 1931 page 2, 
it says: 
" 'Mr. Wood advises the committee he has received confidential 
information to the effect that Farson, Son & Company had communi- 
cated with certain holders of bonds of the city of Coral Gables, 
suggesting that they pledge their coupons with them so that they 
might collect the same through proceedings in the court. The 
committee requested Mr. Wood to convey this information to Mr. 
Wyman, with a request the city commissioners promptly advise the 
committee when any funds were available so that the committee 
could immediately receive them and thereby minimize the effect of 
any such judgment.' 
"Do you recall that? 
"Mr. Barker. I think that was the substance of it. 
"Q. Did you receive such a communication from the committee, 
Mr. Wyman? 
"Mr. Wyman. I am not sure about the date, but correspondence 
of that sort was received sometime during the summer or fall, or both 
of 1931, and subsequently the city arranged, instead of carrying a 
substantial working balance, to pay over to the committee all surplus 
funds as soon as received, so there would be nothing available to 
the bondholders who commenced suit against the city, no money 
on hand, and made an arrangement on two or three different occa- 
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sions by which the bondholders committee would repurchase from 
the city coupons which were paid, in case the city needed money for 
operations. 
"Q. Do you mean to say, Mr. Wyman, that the city was arrang- 
ing with the committee to keep its cash drawer cleaned out, so to 
speak? 
"Mr. Wyman. Yes sir. 
"Q. So as to put into the hands or possession of the committee 
such funds from time to time that otherwise might possibly be 
reached by non-depositors? 
"Mr. Wyman. Yes sir. 
"The Trial Examiner. Did the committee represent a majority 
at that time? 
"Mr. Wyman. They said at the time they negotiated this agree- 
ment, July, 1931, that they had 51 per cent. 
"Q. Mr. Barker, I have a copy of a letter from Mr. Wyman to 
you, in which he says in part, 'We are faced with a mandamus 
suit to pay the Helen Hopkins judgment of approximately $13,000. 
We expect that papers will be filed today and are, therefore, clean- 
ing out our accounts. Unfortunately for you, the general fund does 
not at this time have any money to cause us worry in a mandamus 
suit.' 
"Q. Do you know, Mr. Barker, what Mr. Shaw did in the direc- 
tion of cleaning out the account? 
"A. I presume he sent it to us."'21 
This arrangement was subsequently carried a step further, as related 
in the following testimony of Messrs. Barker and Wyman: 
"Q. Mr. Barker, in this letter of October 24, 1932, from Mr. 
Wyman to you, he states: 
"'A plan has been devised, however, which will assure protec- 
tion against any bondholder securing anything by mandamus; in 
other words, operating with the banlk account in the 'red' at all 
times. This will necessitate advances by the committee when taxes 
cease to come in, these advances to be as needed for operation, and 
as suggested.' 
"What was that plan, Mr. Wyman, as worked out, which resulted 
in keeping the bank account in the 'red' at all times? 
"Mr. Wyman. Outside of sending the surplus moneys to the 
committee, I think there were advance payments made on account 
of operating expenses and so forth, before they became due. 
21. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMBf ISSION IN THE 
MATTER OF PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES FOR BONDHOLDERS OF THE CITY OF CORAL GABLES, 
FLORIDA (1935) at 634 et seq. 
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"Q. And that step was taken, designed to perform the function 
of blocking or defeating any attempt of non-depositors to collect; 
is that correct? 
"Mr. Wyman. Yes, the committee said if non-depositing creditors 
could collect money from the city, they would see no reason for 
their depositing bonds with the committee."22 
Another practice adopted on several occasions by several other com- 
mittees operating in Florida was to secure writs of so-called "continuing 
mandamus" issued by the lower state courts, requiring cities to pay 
over to the petitioners not only funds on hand and applicable to debt 
service, but also any funds that might thereafter come into the possession 
of the city for that purpose during the current fiscal year.-3 Still a 
fourth "bearing down" device has been contrived in connection with 
the practice frequently resorted to by financially embarrassed taxing 
districts of accepting their own bonds and coupons in payment of de- 
linquent taxes and assessments. Since the practice as such may be, and 
often is, opposed by creditors as illegal, a committee is in a position to 
exert further pressure on non-depositors by conditioning its acquiescence 
in the practice on an undertaking by the debtor to accept in payment 
of taxes only certificates of deposit rather than the original (unde- 
posited) obligations.24 This naturally has the effect of opening a pre- 
ferred market for the certificates of deposit and thereby depressing the 
market value, if any, of undeposited obligations. 
These are but a few illustrations chosen from a potentially lengthy 
catalogue of pressure devices which have been employed in one case 
or another. Committees of course use other forms of persuasion. Non- 
depositors are circularized and their unstrategic position demonstrated 
to them by quotations from eminent committee counsel.25 Recalcitrants 
are personally solicited through retail bond dealers with whom they are 
accustomed to deal. Large institutional or wealthy individual investors 
who can afford to bide their time, and prove immune to other forms 
of pressure or persuasion, may be offered participation on special terms, 
namely, without deposit, with a special guarantee as to their maximum 
liability for committee charges, an understanding that their contribution 
to the committee's expenses shall be payable only from the first interest 
coupon or two of the new securities to be issued them under the pro- 
posed plan, and in extreme cases without any liability whatever for 
committee expenditures. 
But while protective committees with substantial backing have avail- 
able means for rendering difficult the position of the dissenter and for 
22. Id. at 644-645. 
23. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 100. 
24. Id. at 101. 
25. Instances are cited in S. E. C., op. cit. suira note 2, at 18, 98-99. 
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exerting on him a variety of pressure, it cannot be said that such tactics 
are uniformly effective. Resort to many of these pressure devices is at 
best an expensive gamble, as the minute books of many a protective 
committee will reveal. A considerable period of months and not infre- 
quently of years is likely to be consumed in their employment without 
assurance as to the outcome. The record of the hearings before Congress 
on the Sumners-Wilcox Municipal Bankruptcy Bill bears forcible witness 
to the fact that in a number of situations all the pressure which a com- 
mittee was able to muster over a period of several years proved insuffi- 
cient to bring in a large enough portion of the minority dissenting 
securities to warrant declaring a plan in effect.2" 
Even granting, however, that there have been a goodly number of 
situations wherein a substantial majority of creditors acting in concert 
with the debtor have been unable-at least over a considerable period 
of years-to find a way to buy off or coerce a sufficient number of dis- 
senters into participation, there remains another consideration which 
may be treated as the second current view of the problem of the dissent- 
ing minority for purposes of this discussion. As expressed by Pro- 
fessor James A. McLaughlin in the hearings on the Sumners-Wilcox 
Bill: 
"I realize you have the situation of the recalcitrant minority, but 
as Mr. Lashly very properly said this morning, you must not assume 
what so many people are assuming, that every minority is a recal- 
citrant minority. If you do you are putting yourself into the hands 
of a limited class of Wall Street attorneys, the men who are always 
with the "insiders", the minority that controls. The majority never 
controls anything, any corporation or bondholders' committee or 
Congress or anything else. It is the intelligent forceful aggressive 
minority that rules. 
. . . If you are going to have a recalcitrant minority, it should 
be balanced by a provision for protecting us from an aggressive, 
inside minority that gets this big list signed up under the deposit 
agreement before they know what they are signing up."27 
In other words, if pressure is necessary to overcome the inertia or 
hostility of security holders, regulation of those in a position to exercise 
such pressure would seem to be necessary if pressure is not to assume 
the form of oppressive coercion.23 The problem of devising ways and 
means for dealing with minority obstruction is, in short, bound up as 
a matter of policy with the complementary problem of securing adequate 
supervision and regulation of protective committees and other similar 
26. See note 8 sup ra. 
27. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on, 
S. r868 and H. R. 595o, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) 126. 
28. S. E. C, op. cit. supra note 2, at 102. 
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organizations or agencies purporting to speak for creditors-usually for 
majority groups of creditors. 
A third current reaction finds its point of departure in the extreme 
complexity of the average local government default situation. For a 
municipality is more than a legal entity with a debt at issue; it is an 
extremely complicated aggregate of economic and social groups. Its 
creditors, even of a single class, are by no means a homogeneous group 
with an identity of interest. The inconvenient fact is that "every mu- 
nicipal default is like a drama in which there are many players. Bankers, 
lawyers, municipal bondholders, holder's of the unfunded obligations and 
real estate mortgages, local officials, taxpayers, municipal employees and 
civic groups-all play some part."2 It is correspondingly difficult to 
generalize about the consequences of default-and the fairness of any 
given readjustment plan-even with respect to a legally or superficially 
homogeneous group like the holders of general bonds or any other par- 
ticular class of obligations of the debtor taxing district. 
Consider merely the holders of funded obligations for whom a single 
protective committee will ordinarily purport to speak. If one of them 
happens to be a banking institution located in, or having business rela- 
tions with, the debtor taxing district, it may quite conceivably be in a 
position to profit by default. An excuse is afforded for raising interest 
rates on short term loans to the debtor local subdivision. If it has a 
hand in the refunding operations it will probably receive the customary 
commissions for such work. It may moreover be substantially interested 
in real estate mortgages on property within the debtor subdivision, junior 
in their lien to unpaid taxes or assessments levied on such property. It 
may be interested either directly or through affiliates in the buying up 
of other defaulted obligations of the debtor subdivision as a "hedge" or 
in downright speculation at bargain prices; market prices usually drop 
precipitately as soon as default becomes public knowledge and there are 
indications that the past few years have seen considerable speculation 
in defaulted municipals. Other types of institutional holder-notably the 
insurance companies and fraternal benefit organizations-and wealthy 
individual holders may in any given case have similarly conflicting inter- 
ests. 
Against this potentially complex background it is clear that the value 
of any given percentage of consents as a hallmark of the fairness of a 
readjustment plan may be extremely deceptive in the particular case, even 
from the point of view only of the class of obligations which the consents 
purport to represent. Nor is the fairness of a plan always ascertainable 
by scrutiny of its terms. "Normally it will be necessary to inquire into 
the background of the plan and the activities of the negotiators to ascer- 
29. HILLHOUSE, .supra note 1, at 428. 
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tain if the antecedent and collateral phases of the plan are free of over- 
reaching and coercion."30 This implies that any one governmental agency 
empowered to coerce a minority into participation in a "fair" plan of 
debt adjustment would have in each case to undertake a very intensive 
and extensive investigation into all the circumstances of the case. In 
the belief that extended investigations of this character could not feas- 
ibly be carried on by any court or other governmental agency-state 
or federal-which might conceivably be so empowered, as a matter of 
routine in every case brought before it, some have feared that any 
procedure which might be devised for the coercing of minorities would 
be too susceptible of misuse by special interests and irresponsible debtors 
to the detriment of those whose sole stake in the situation is their invest- 
ment in the security.3' They conclude that the existing situation is "still 
the most satisfactory in the long run, in spite of the element of head- 
clubbing."32 
Proponents of this point of view profess to find support for this 
hands-off attitude in the allegedly fictitious character of any determina- 
tion in advance as to the capacity of a municipality or the taxing district 
to pay over a long period of years. For, such capacity admittedly depends 
not only on assessed valuation, on the private wealth and volume of 
business in a community, but on many other problematical future fac- 
tors. Will new overlapping special districts with power to levy taxes 
and incur debts be created in the debtor territory, for example; can it 
be guaranteed that sinking fund provisions will be observed or that 
tax levy and collection methods will be as efficient as a given plan may 
contemplate; how forecast the amount of additional interest-bearing 
obligations which the debtor may incur in the future through the issue 
of bonds for capital improvements; what assurance can there be that 
a public debtor's future operating expenses will be kept within the bounds 
of a plan ?33 This phase of the problem has been emphasized by a 
Florida attorney who has often acted for bondholders and bondholders' 
committees: "By discussion with municipal officials, the creditors can 
nearly always arrive at some reasonably fair solution of the immediate 
problem of how much money should be used for current operations and 
30. Douglas, The Legal Problem of Control Over Protective Committees For 
Afunicipal and Quasi-Mltunicipal Obligations (1936) 2 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERN- 
MENT 81, 86. 
31. See statements by Lashly, op. cit. supra note 27, at 84-99; and Bangs, id., at 
73 et seq. 
32. See the summary of discussion by Vanderbilt of Dimock's "Legal Problems of 
Financially Embarrassed Municipalities" in PROCEEDINGS, ECTION OF MUNICIPAL LAW, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FIRST ANNUAL MEETING (1935), at 26 et seq. 
33. See discussion of "The Lack of Adequate State Supervision Over Future 
Borrowing and Fiscal Administration of Local Units" in S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, 
at 55-60. 
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how much can be raised for debt service. A permanent solution must 
wait for more normal times, for a settlement should not be made for 
the next 25 or 30 years in the midst of a period of depression."34 
Still another reaction to the minority problem, which for the pur- 
poses of this discussion may be catalogued as the fourth, although like- 
wise preoccupied with the complexities of the problem, fails to conclude 
that improvement through some form of governmental intervention is 
either impossible or undesirable. As expressed by Edward J. Dimock, 
a New York bond attorney: "I confess that the old system of having 
the municipality and the legislature on one side, and individual creditors 
and astute lawyers on the other, beat each other into a state of com- 
paratively submissive docility, has worked remarkably well, considering 
the handicaps involved, but I see no reason why we should not attempt 
to remove those handicaps and reach the goal without such a lavish 
expenditure of time, energy and money."35 But the peculiar complexi- 
ties inherent in local government default and the normally great diver- 
sity of the parties in interest are urged as pointing to the need for some 
form of centralized administrative control or an "omnibus proceeding" 
as distinguished from a federal judicial shortcut under the bankruptcy 
power. 
It has already been emphasized that intensive investigation of the ante- 
cedent and collateral phases of any readjustment plan which might be sub- 
mitted to a court will be necessary if its "fairness" from the point of view 
merely of the creditors directly affected is to be ascertained. Over and 
above the practical difficulties implied in the foregoing proposition from 
the point of view of the court and of minority creditors seeking to oppose 
a bankruptcy petition, it is urged that a judicial proceeding in bank- 
ruptcy would almost inevitably prove "too summary in allowing a 
voluntary agreement to be entered into between the taxing district on 
the one hand and the creditors on the other hand, ignoring the interests 
of people who are not creditors and who are not properly represented 
by the taxing district."36 The reference is to taxpayers, non-taxpaying 
voting residents, employees of the taxing district, and other economic 
groups with a stake in the situation. 
The need for some form of impartial outside management and con- 
trol of insolvent taxing districts is also stressed in favor of centralized 
administrative supervision or the omnibus proceeding. There is no 
question that peaceable debt readjustment is often much delayed by the 
shifting political complexion of local government administrations, by 
the unavailability of accurate and complete financial data concerning the 
34. Patterson, in op. cit. supra note 32, at 27-28. 
35. Dimock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 55-56. 
36. Statement by Sturges in Hearings, op. cit. supra note 8, at 105-106. 
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debtor, and by the pulling and hauling necessary to put current operating 
expenses on a reasonably efficient basis.37 Creditors are put to great 
expense in attempting to obtain the necessary data for themselves. Offi- 
cials of the debtor are antagonized by what naturally appear to be hostile 
investigations of the situation conducted by non-resident representatives 
of creditors presumably unacquainted with the reasonableness of par- 
ticular municipal expenditures and the needs of the particular community. 
Concrete demonstration of the debtor's potential capacity to pay is clear- 
ly not promoted. The preparation and negotiation of a plan of adjust- 
ment is delayed. 
A further consideration favoring centralized administrative super- 
vision or an omnibus proceeding is the need for a breathing spell during 
which concerted action on behalf of all parties in interest may be fur- 
thered and each protected through a stay of litigation against others 
seeking an immediate advantage." The pressure for such a breathing 
spell has been evidenced time and again by the many attempts-usually 
unsuccessful-to induce courts during previous periods of municipal 
depression to appoint receivers for insolvent taxing districts under their 
general equity jurisdictions. Legislation enacted in recent years in a 
few of the states authorizing central state administrative agencies to 
exercise supervisory and managerial powers over local subdivisions in 
default more or less akin to those of the equity receiver further evidence 
the pressure in question.40 
Provision for some such form of outside and impartial management 
and control over an insolvent local subdivision would, in the opinion 
of some of its sponsors, go far to eliminate much of the delay, expense 
and nuisance generally attributed to minority creditor obstruction in 
addition to facilitating orderly arnd equitable adjustments in other 
respects. To quote Messrs. Dimock and Frye: "In our opinion the 
absence of an omnibus proceeding [as contrasted with the absence of 
judicial machinery for giving binding force over all creditors to the 
fair and reasonable refunding] is in practice the more serious weakness. 
If such an omnibus proceeding were afforded, all the issues in the case 
would be brought to the surface. In its absence, many important and 
relevant problems are often concealed because the character of the liti- 
gation may be controlled either by an individual's desire to secure a 
preference over others who have equal rights, or by a committee's desire 
37. See the discussion of particular instances in S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, 
at 46 et seq. 
38. See Dimock, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 44 et seq; and S. E. C., op. cit. suPra note 2, 
at 103 et seq. 
39. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 104. 
40. See Stason, State Administrative Supervisio,& of Local Indebtedness (1932) 30 
MICH. L. REV. 833; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 989 et seq. 
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to force all bondholders to be represented by that particular committee."' 
Not that judicial machinery for the binding of an obdurate minority 
could in all cases be dispensed with; it is conceded that, "if there is no 
way of making the settlement binding upon all of the creditors alike 
it will be no settlement at all."42 The suggestion is, however, that if 
federal legislation be indeed necessary to bind dissenters to a plan it 
should be available only by way of a complement to administrative re- 
ceivership or the omnibus proceeding.43 
And the main problem of affording some measure of outside manage- 
ment or control over the insolvent debtor by way of central administra- 
tive receivership or an omnibus proceeding is, so some contend, a matter 
which may most appropriately be entrusted to the states. In addition 
to considerations rooted in state sovereignty several arguments are 
adduced., The extent to which the question of capacity to pay is related 
in any given case to matters present and future which are solely within 
the control of the state legislature-the whole range of the debtor's 
charter powers with respect to future fiscal practices and management, 
the creation or abolition of overlapping taxing districts, and general 
state laws regulating the fiscal affairs of local subdivisions-unquestion- 
ably gives the state legislature "the inside track". The primary respon- 
sibility for the fulfillment by local political subdivisions of their valid 
obligations which must be implied from the sovereign control vested in 
the states, moreover, prompts a fear that to relieve the states of that 
responsibility in any manner would have an unfortunate effect on state 
morale in matters of municipal credit.44 Finally, the very complexity of 
municipal insolvency and the rather intensive investigations required in 
each case to ascertain the facts prompt the further argument that to 
vest a responsibility for effectively supervising and controlling all the 
parties to these situations, which are scattered throughout the country, 
in any federal instrumentality would be to ignore "the real and practical 
limitations upon beneficial governmental administration."}45 
Others are less sanguine with respect at least to state administrative 
control or receivership during default. Legislative provision for it has, 
after all, been enacted in but a few states, and even in those instances 
compromise with "home rule" considerations has been necessary.46 There 
41. Dimock and Frye, op. cit. supra note 20, at 188-189. 
42. Dimock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 44. 
43. Id., at 51 et seq.; Sturges, op. cit. supra note 36, at 107. 
44. See testimony by Dimock in PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THEE SECURITIES AND EX- 
CHANGE COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTECTIVE COMMITTIEE FOR HOLDERS OF 
SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF ASBURY PARI, NEW JERSEY, AND OTHER MUNICIPALITIES 
AND PUBLIC INSTRUMENTALITIES (1935) at 747-748; and by Tooke, id. at 806. 
45. Dimock and Frye, op. cit. supra note 20, at 193. 
46. See the discussion in S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 107 et seq.; and the testi- 
mony of Chairman Darby of the New Jersey Municipal Finance Commission in op. cit. 
supra note 44, at 541 et seq. 
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is the further objection that it works best when it is least needed, which 
is to say that in a state where a great many municipalities or other local 
subdivisions are in default and unable to borrow money, powers con- 
ferred on a state agency are quite likely to be either abused or not 
exercised.47 A member of one such state board has been quoted by 
counsel to a considerable number of bondholders' protective committees 
as saying that "if they attempted to exercise their powers at this time, 
when scores of counties and municipalities of the State were in default, 
the control act would be repealed and that he thought it would be better 
to wait until most of the State had gotten out of its financial difficulties, 
when they might be able to proceed effectively against the few political 
subdivisions, which then remained in default."48 
2. 
These reactions to the fact of the disproportionate leverage of minority 
dissent are believed to be typical. They illustrate the multiform aspects 
of the problem, and its intimate relationship to other major issues aris- 
ing out of the business of municipal debt readjustment. They also make 
up the background against which the recent federal legislation addressed 
to the minority problem may be viewed in perspective. 
Probably the first attempt to authorize federal courts to bring about 
compromises on municipal indebtedness was a bill introduced by Repre- 
sentative Joy of Missouri in 1902 4; but up to 1934 Congress had never 
included municipalities or other political subdivisions of a state as sub- 
jects of bankruptcy legislation. By 1933, however, the minority problem 
had become a compelling stimulant to bankruptcy legislation for finan- 
cially embarrassed local government units and their creditors. In 1932, 
indeed, the Mississippi legislature had adopted an insolvency act for 
drainage districts-declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court 
in 1935.50 In Florida numerous municipalities and the protective com- 
mittees for their bondholders were experiencing difficulties at the hands 
of dissenting bondholders. The City of Coral Gables and its committee, 
for example, were agreed upon a plan to which 86%o of the bondholders 
had assented; but it developed that there was little prospect of obtain- 
ing the assents of any of the remainder, and the plan could not be con- 
47. See the discussion by Dimock, op. cit. satpra note 3, at 45-46, 55; by Patterson, 
op. cit. supra note 34, at 27-28; and by Wood in "State Control of Municipal Finances" 
(address delivered before the annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Mil- 
wvaukee, Aug. 27, 1934, reprinted in The Bond Buyer, Sept. 1, 1934). 
48. Wood, op. cit. supra note 47. 
49. H. R. 12596, unsuccessfully introduced on March 15, 1902, (1902) 19 The 
Bond Buyer 385. 
50. MISS. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1933) ? 4526 (1-26); Pryor et al., Comm'rs. of 
Sabougla Drainage District v. Goza, 172 Miss. 46, 159 So. 99 (1935). 
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summated. One idea growing out of that impasse has been related by 
counsel to the protective committee: 
"A. . . . Mayor Wyman and I had many conferences regarding 
the necessity of getting a substantial amount of bonds deposited 
under the plan, and we worked for several years and spent quite 
a bit of money trying to accomplish that. Finally it looked to us 
as though we never were going to be able to accomplish it. Mayor 
Wyman had a lot of suggestions. I mean to say, he was very 
fertile with suggestions. The first suggestion was we get an act of 
the legislature of Florida enacted to condemn the outstanding bonds 
at their market value. I told him I thought that was unconstitu- 
tional, but I am informed that such a bill was actually introduced 
in the legislature of Florida. I don't know that of my own knowl- 
edge, but I am informed such a bill was introduced but never 
passed." 51 
The first bills introduced in Congress during this period were in Feb- 
ruary of 1933. Senator Norris of Nebraska and Representative McLeod 
of Michigan introduced measures designed to afford a moratorium on 
principal and interest to such insolvent municipal corporations having 
a population of not less than 50,000 and an indebtedness of not less 
than $1,000,000, as might petition the court.52 Senator Fletcher intro- 
duced a bill prompted by the Coral Gables and other similar Florida 
municipal situations, and inspired by the Railroad and Corporation 
Bankruptcy Acts.53 No one of these bills passed as the time for con- 
sideration was short, but during the opening days of the new Congress 
Representative Wilcox of Florida introduced a bill very similar to the 
Fletcher bill and Representative McLeod reintroduced his moratorium 
bill.54 The McLeod bill did not withstand creditor resistance, but the 
Wilcox bill, subsequently modified in various particulars and thereafter 
known as the Sumners-Wilcox bill, was eventually enacted on May 24, 
1934, as Sections 78-80 of the National Bankruptcy Act.55 
Who were the supporters, and who the opponents of this legislation? 
The record58 rather discourages any facile attempt to classify the Act 
as "debtor-relief" at the expense of creditors or as a measure designed 
to favor any one interest class unduly at the expense of the others. 
Among its chief advocates were municipal officials, investment bankers, 
bondholders' protective committees and a few insurance companies. 
51. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 869-870. 
52. S. 5699 and H. R. 14789. See also Report No. 2191 of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary on H. R. 14789, 72nd Cong., 2d. sess., (1934). 
53. See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 117. 
54. Id., at 116-117. 
55. 48 STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. ?? 301-303 (1934). 
56. See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 8; and HiLLHousE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 
396-403. 
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Opposing the measure were the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
the American Bankers Association, and a great many insurance com- 
panies and fraternal benefit societies. Congressional support for the bill 
was strongest among representatives from the South and West; oppo- 
sition came from the eastern and north central states. 
Enacted as an emergency measure of two years duration the Act 
was subsequently extended to January 1, 1940. 7 Its plan was simply 
to permit any local government unit which might be insolvent or unable 
to meet its debts as they matured, voluntarily to file a petition in bank- 
ruptcy. A saving clause provided that nothing in the Act should be 
construed to limit or impair the power of any state to control any 
political subdivision in the exercise of its political or governmental 
powers, including the power to require that the filing of a petition in 
bankruptcy and any plan of readjustment be approved by the state. 
In other words, the petition had to be voluntary; and, if the state law 
so required, it had to be accompanied by the consent of the state. The 
federal court, sitting in bankruptcy, would thereafter be empowered 
to confirm the plan, if it found it to be fair and if the required per- 
centage of the creditors approved. Upon confirmation, the plan would 
be binding upon minority, as well as majority, creditors, and upon the 
debtor. 
Several specific characteristics of this legislation deserve special notice. 
It did not, to begin with, purport to afford a comprehensive "omnibus 
proceeding." The only parties to the proceeding contemplated were 
creditors and the debtor taxing district. "Creditors," for all purposes 
of the Act, did not include salary and wage claimants; even taxpayers 
or non-taxpaying voters were not accorded any standing in the pro- 
ceeding. The petitioning taxing district was entitled to be heard on all 
questions. A petition could be contested by creditors holding 5%o "in 
amount of the bonds, notes, or certificates of indebtedness." Any credi- 
tor, upon filing a petition for leave to intervene, might be heard on such 
questions arising in the proceeding as the judge should determine. Any 
creditor might be heard on the question of confirmation. 
In still another respect did the proceeding contemplated by the Act 
fall short of an omnibus proceeding. No petition could be filed until 
a definitive plan of adjustment which had been prepared and accepted 
by a stated percentage of creditors58 could be presented with the peti- 
tion. A considerable period of months or years of litigation and nego- 
tiation might conceivably elapse before those conditions could be com- 
plied with and the benefit of court intervention (as by stay of other 
57. Pub. L. No. 507, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (April 10, 1936). 
58. 30% in the case of agricultural special districts and 51% in the case of all other 
taxing districts in amount of the bonds, notes, and certificates of indebtedness affected. 
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litigation) obtained. What the Act offered, in other words, was a "short 
receivership" to be employed at the end rather than at the beginning 
of readjustment negotiations. It did not, in consequence, purport to 
render unnecessary or to foreclose a state administrative receivership 
or "omnibus proceeding," and indeed expressly provided that "when- 
ever there shall exist or shall hereafter be created under the law of any 
State any agency of such State authorized to exercise supervision or 
control over the fiscal affairs of all or any political subdivisions thereof, 
and whenever such agency has assumed such supervision or control over 
any political subdivision, then no petition of such political subdivision 
may be received hereunder unless accompanied by the written approval 
of such agency, and no plan of readjustment shall be put into temporary 
effect or finally confirmed without the written approval of such agency 
of such plans." 
The Act also. failed to provide any effective machinery for supervision 
and control over protective committees or other representatives of ma- 
jority creditors which, as has been pointed out, is an essential comple- 
ment to any machinery for the coercing of minorities and obtaining 
approval of readjustment plans. The Act did, to be sure, require that 
the protective committee or agent file a list of the creditors represented 
and a copy of the agreement whereunder the committee purported to 
act. Disclosure of all compensation to be received by the committee 
was also required; and the judge was empowered to allow reasonable 
compensation and reimbursement of necessary expenses incurred in 
connection with the proceeding, and payment of readjustment managers 
committees or other representatives of creditors, with the proviso, how- 
ever, that no such compensation or reimbursements should be assessed 
against the taxing district except in the manner and in such sums, if 
any, as might be provided for in the plan. But even in cases where the 
Act might be invoked such provisions clearly fell short of effective super- 
vision and control over protective committees. Up to the time when a 
petition was filed there would be no supervision at all, and protective 
committees are usually organized soon after default. The court would, 
therefore, acquire the very limited jurisdiction over committees contem- 
plated by the Act only when a committee had almost reached the end 
of its existence and activity.59 
By the same token the proceeding contemplated under the Act was 
scarcely designed to afford that measure of outside management and 
control over the debtor advocated by those who favor administrative 
receivership or an omnibus proceeding. The Act did empower the judge 
to require a petitioning taxing district to file such schedules and submit 
such other information as might be necessary to disclose the conduct 
59. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 30, at 85. 
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of the affairs of the district and the fairness of any proposed plan. The 
debtor might also be required to open its books, records and files to the 
inspection of any creditor. Any matters might be referred to a special 
master "for consideration and report upon specified issues." But the 
opportunity for all this was, under the Act as drawn, afforded at too 
late a stage in the readjustment proceeding to serve its purpose. 
The Act, moreover, apparently failed to confer on the court in a 
pending proceeding sufficiently wide and express power to make such 
orders as might be necessary from time to time to protect the interests 
of creditors barred by the stay of litigation from bringing independent 
actions at law or in equity. For, unless the court were empowered in its 
discretion to order at least as much as the creditors might themselves 
obtain by litigation in the absence of a stay, such a proceeding might 
quite conceivably be utilized by the debtor for the sole purpose of delay,6? 
once it had a sufficient number of assenting creditors to file a petition, 
though not enough to obtain confirmation of a plan. 
3. 
The short life of the Act makes it difficult to draw definite conclu- 
sions from the proceedings had under it. It is likewise difficult to esti- 
mate what influence the mere possibility of its being involved may have 
had in discouraging minority dissent."' In any event relatively few pub- 
lic debtors had invoked it up to the spring of 1936. The latest check 
shows a total of 88 petitioners scattered throughout twenty states.62 
Only 24 of these were incorporated cities, villages or towns, the largest 
of which was Corpus Christi, Texas, with a population of 27,741. North 
Bergen township in New Jersey was the only petitioner in the East, 
with an indebtedness of some $16,000,000 and a population of about 
60. See criticism of the Act along these lines in S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 123. 
61. Testimony of Mr. Wood, as counsel to numerous bondholders' protective com- 
mittees, on this point was as follows: 
"Q. Has the existence of this act, in your opinion, been a factor in averting 
minority interferences? 
"A. Very decidedly. 
"Q. When it has not been invoked? 
"A. It has been a very great help to the organized creditors, even in those cases 
where no petition has been filed. 
"For instance, some committees had proposed refunding plans. I 
received communications from lawyers throughout the country stating that 
they represented holders of 25, 50, or 100 bonds, and that they did not 
intend to accept the refunding plan. They wanted to know what we sug- 
gested, as counsel for the bondholders' committee, and we would reply to 
such a communication by sending a copy of this act, and that would usually 
be all we would ever hear of it. Later on their bonds would be exchanged." 
[Op. cit. supra note 44, at 734-735] 
62. HILLHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 386 et seq. 
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40,000. North Bergen and the Merced Irrigation District in California, 
with an indebtedness also approximating $16,000,000, were the two peti- 
tioners with the largest debts involved. Irrigation and drainage districts 
were by far the most frequent petitioners. 
Most of these petitions were still pending when the Act was declared 
unconstitutional, but plans had been confirmed by final order in at least 
16 cases."3 Information available with respect to ten of these plans 
(7 were for special districts and 3 for small municipal corporations) 
shows a scaling of principal by over 40%o at least in each of the special 
district cases save one, and of 50%7o in that case.04 Interest was reduced 
in all cases. Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans provided the new 
money for refinancing in most of the special district settlements. 
Why more municipalities and taxing districts in default did not seek 
to file under the Act during its brief existence has occasioned consider- 
able discussion. Some of the reasons, however, are clear. In many 
instances debtors were asking their creditors merely for an extension of 
maturity dates and perhaps for a reduction of interest over the next few 
years. On such terms readjustment is likely to be possible without resort 
to bankruptcy. In the more difficult situations to which the Act was 
primarily addressed it had not proved possible in many instances even 
by the close of 1935 for creditors and their debtor to fulfill filing re- 
quirements by arriving at a definite refunding plan, securing necessary 
enabling legislation and the required percentage of consents. 
The particular case which ultimately came before the Supreme Court 
was that of the Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1. 
Embracing some 43,000 acres in Texas, it was organized in 1914. The 
plan submitted to the bankruptcy court in 1934 called for the compromise 
of $800,000 face amount of bonded debt, bearing 6% interest, on a 
basis of forty-nine and a fraction cents on the dollar, out of funds 
to be borrowed from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 4%. 
Most of these bonds had been issued in 1914; the remainder in 1919. 
More than 30%o of the bondholders had filed acceptance of the plan 
along with the petition. The district further alleged that holders of 
more than the requisite two-thirds in amount of the bonds would do 
so in the course of the proceeding. 
This petition was contested by holders of something over 5%o of the 
bonds outstanding. The district court dismissed the petition on the 
ground inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional.0 The circuit court 
of appeals, however, held the Act a valid exercise of the bankruptcy 
63. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 122. 
64. HILLHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 390. 
65. Its re Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 
(S. D. Tex., 1934). 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:17:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
19361 MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT 219 
power and reversed the decision below.60 While the case was pending in 
this court, the Texas legislature adopted legislation to enable local political 
subdivisions, including the petitioner, to invoke the Sumners-Wilcox 
Act. The case then came before the Supreme Court on certiorari. The 
ensuing decision07 by the bare majority of that Court was disappoint- 
ing to many students of the problem. Not that they were unaware that 
the inclination of certain members of the Court would be unfavorable 
to the Act; indeed, few would contend that it was in its existing form 
either a comprehensive answer to all the problems in this field or even 
that it was aptly framed to achieve its more limited declared purpose. 
The disappointing feature of the majority opinion consists rather in 
what one is tempted to term the unnecessarily, if not indiscriminately, 
sweeping statement of the chief ground on which the decision was based. 
The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, assumed 
for purposes of the discussion that the Act was "adequately related to 
the general 'subject of bankruptcies'." The petitioner was characterized 
as a "political subdivision of the State, created for the local exercise of 
her sovereign powers," the right to borrow money as "essential to its 
operations," and the conclusion drawn that its fiscal affairs were there- 
fore "those of the State, not subject to control or interference by the 
National Government, unless the right to do so is definitely accorded by 
the Federal Constitution." The bankruptcy poiver was then considered, 
and, by analogy to the taxing power, deemed impliedly limited by the 
"necessity of preserving independence of the States." Feeling that appli- 
cation of the statutory provisions in question "might materially restrict 
respondent's control over its fiscal affairs" and stating that "the especial 
purpose of all bankruptcy legislation is to interfere with the relations 
between the parties concerned'to change, modify or impair the obligation 
of their contracts", the majority held the Act invalid. 
The element of state consent, required by the Act as a condition to 
filing under it (and present in this case), did not in the opinion of the 
majority alter the situation. The preservation of the states was declared 
to be as much a matter of federal as of state concern. "The sovereignty 
of the State essential to its proper functioning under the Federal Con- 
stitution cannot be surrendered . . . " As an additional reason for 
holding the Act invalid the Court stated that such state consent, if recog- 
nized as having any effect, would necessarily fall within the constitu- 
tional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts. 
As if these grounds were not broad enough, the opinion proceeds: "Our 
66. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1 v. Ashton, 81 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). 
67. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892 
(1936). 
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special concern is with the existence of the power claimed-not merely 
the immediate outcome of what has already been attempted. And it is 
of the first importance that due attention be given to the results which 
might be brought about by the exercise of such a power in the future." 
If the federal bankruptcy machinery could be extended to local political 
subdivisions like the respondent, why not to the state, the majority asked? 
And if voluntary proceedings could be permitted, why not involuntary 
ones ? 
The minority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo in which the Chief 
Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone joined, conceived 
the issue presented to be much narrower than the opinion of the majority 
had implied.68 No attempted extension of the bankruptcy power to the 
states or authorization of involuntary proceedings against local subdivi- 
sions was before the Court, and should such questions ever arise, it was 
pointed out, the Court would presumably be equal to the task of dis- 
tinguishing them from the one now in issue. The plight of local public 
debtors and their creditors was reviewed, prevailing doubts with respect 
to the constitutionality of any attempt to provide relief similar to that 
contemplated by the Sumners-Wilcox Act through state legislation con- 
firmed, and the conclusion reached that "if voluntary bankruptcies are 
anathema for governmental units, municipalities and creditors have been 
caught in a vise from which it is impossible to let them out." 
Even accepting the familiar limitations on the taxing power implied 
in the interest of state sovereignty as an analogy, nevertheless, as Justice 
Cardozo said, consent has been traditionally regarded in the tax field 
as sufficient to preserve the balance between state and national power: 
a state may not tax the instrumentalities of the federal government with- 
out its consent, but it may with such consent;"9 similarly, consent being 
given, the federal government may lay a tax upon the states.70 With 
respect to the majority's contention that state consent would constitute 
an impairment of contracts, the minority retorted: "The Act does not 
authorize the states to impair through their own laws the obligations 
of existing contracts.... At most what they do is to waive a personal 
privilege that they would be at liberty to claim. ... If contracts are 
impaired, the tie is cut or loosened through the action of the court of 
bankruptcy.... 
4. 
But whatever may be thought of the majority's decision it stands, at 
least for the time being, as controlling. If it is to remain in all its 
68. 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 896 (1936). 
69. Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission of Maryland, 297 U. S. 
209 (1936). 
70. Cf. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936). 
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breadth, it may well be that insolvent local public debtors and their 
creditors have been "caught in a vise from which it is impossible to 
let them out." Assuming for the sake of discussion that the opinion 
is to be taken literally, let us consider what possibilities remain. 
If machinery for binding a minority to a fair and equitable plan of 
debt adjustment cannot be provided by Congress, have the states power 
so to provide? So far as indebtedness incurred prior to the enactment 
of any given state bankruptcy legislation is concerned, the early deci- 
sion of the Supreme Court in Sturges v. Crowinshield7' has indicated 
that the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts is 
a bar. And so far as debts subsequently incurred are concerned, the 
decision rendered a few years later in Ogden v. Saunders72 has indicated 
that any discharge under such legislation is unavailing against a non- 
resident creditor who avoids participation in the proceedings. Not all 
students of the problem have been convinced that these questions are 
foreclosed, however, and it may indeed be premature so to assume.73 
But both the majority and the minority in the Ashton case appear to 
have gone out of their way to warn us that the objections arising from 
these two early decisions still stand. The majority of the Court assumed 
as a major premise the proposition that no state could accomplish for 
its subdivisions the end sought by Congress in the Sumners-Wilcox 
Act "under the form of a bankruptcy act or otherwise." And the minor- 
ity said: "Nor was there hope for relief from statutes to be enacted by 
the states. ... A state insolvency act is of no avail as to obligations 
of the debtor incurred before its passage."74 
Failing bankruptcy legislation, it has been suggested that at least a 
measure of the objectives of bankruptcy mechanism might be realized 
through a molding of the practice in connection with the issuance of 
writs of mandamus and mandatory injunctions. The federal courts have 
already exercised a discretion in certain cases, where the claim of a 
plaintiff was too great for a municipality to pay in one year, to provide 
in the mandamus order for a spreading of the amount over several 
years.75 There is also a possibility that the federal courts may eventually 
come to hold that where a taxing district cannot pay all of its creditors 
at once, its obligations can be enforced only ratably for the equal bene- 
fit of all.76 The decision in City of Asbury Park v. Christmas by the 
71. 4 Wheat 122 (U. S. 1819). 
72. 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827). 
73. See discussion on this point in Dimock, op. cit. supra note 3, at 54-55. 
74. 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 897 (1936). 
75. East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600 (1887); Perry v. Town of Samson, 11 F. 
(2d) 655 (M.D.Ala. 1926). 
76. Groner v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Carteret 
County v. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, 78 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 
4th, 1935). 
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circuit court of appeals77 and the subsequent denial of certiorari78 may 
further indicate that the federal courts are vested with a discretion to 
withhold writs of mandamus, when issuing the writ would disrupt 
pending negotiations being conducted in good faith for the benefit of 
the creditors as a whole, or when a state agency has entered the picture 
in an effort to work out a fair adjustment. State courts might conceiv- 
ably adopt the same attitude, although it must be recognized that many 
of them at the present time regard the writ of mandamus for purposes 
of enforcing judgments on municipal bonds as a writ of right.79 
Others feel that the same end might be achieved more speedily and 
with greater uniformity by state and federal legislative regulation of 
the practice in connection with these remedies so as to achieve: (1) 
some balancing off of the disproportionate leverage and nuisance value 
of minority dissenting groups; and (2) assurance of a ratable distri- 
bution of funds available for debt service when the debtor is unable 
to pay all matured claims in full.80 In order to insure against prejudice 
to investors through a denial of remedies in cases where either the 
debtor or an organized majority of creditors were not cooperating in 
good faith to promote a fair adjustment, however, any such legislative 
program should presumably be coupled with a program or programs 
for administrative supervision and control over those major parties to 
the situation. 
It is not our purpose in this article to explore the various constitu- 
tional and other legal issues which naturally arise in connection with 
these proposals. Some of them, particularly in connection with state 
regulation of mandamus practice in the state courts, will suggest them- 
selves to any lawyer. Suffice it to say that at best the objectives of 
bankruptcy legislation could be only partially attained. Many occasions 
for minority dissent would presumably be averted by working out such 
programs, tending as they would toward the development of an "om- 
nibus proceeding." In any case dissent would be discouraged through 
the contemplated reduction of its leverage value. But so long as dis- 
senters might choose to stand apart, a debtor unable to pay them in 
full would continue undischarged and "in default." It is worth noting 
in this connection that the probable need for a bankruptcy machinery 
to complement even state administrative receivership was apparently 
recognized by the New Jersey legislature in 1933 after several years 
experience with such administrative control.8' 
77. 78 F. (2d) 1003 (C.C.A. 3d, 1935). 
78. 296 U. S. 624 (1936). 
79. State v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 1313, 131 So. 533 (1930). 
80. See Douglas, op. cit. sitpra note 30, at 85. 
81. N. J. Laws 1933, c. 331. 
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Might the bankruptcy result be obtained through condemnation of 
a dissenter's bonds or other obligations under the state's power of emi- 
nent domain, at a valuation approximating that placed upon similar 
securities by the plan sought to be put into effect, or perhaps at their 
default market value? Putting to one side the valuation problem, ques- 
tions as to the "public purpose" involved, the situs of bonds held by a 
non-resident and other legal complications implicit in the suggestion, 
it seems reasonably clear that resort to such condemnation by a state 
or political subdivision thereof would not fall within the prohibition 
of the Contracts Clause. For "a contract is property, and like any other 
property, may be taken under condemnation proceedings for public use. 
And "the true view is that the condemnation proceedings do 
not impair the contract, do not break its obligations, but appropriate it, 
as they do the tangible property of the company, to the public uses."82 
5. 
The sweeping and authoritative pronouncements of the majority of 
the Court may result at long last simply in an attainment under different 
doctrinal auspices of the objectives at first thought to be available under 
the bankruptcy power. Bankruptcy is, it is true, an ugly word. But 
should such prove to be the outcome it would be difficult, were one 
not blessed with a certain cosmic outlook, not to wonder whether the 
Ashton decision had not been rather wasteful in point of the time, money 
and energy of all the parties to municipal insolvency. 
All of which leads to the question whether one may not venture to 
hope, should new legislation designed to afford a comprehensive mech- 
anism for the supervision and control of municipal debt adjustment 
and dependent in certain of its component parts on the bankruptcy power 
come before the Court at some future date, that the Court will find it 
possible to limit its decision in the Ashton case, insofar as it dealt with 
the scope of the bankruptcy power, to the specific legislation as applied 
in that particular case. For, as observed by Mr. Justice McReynolds: 
"The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government and the 
opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of 
State and National Governments are many; . . "83 And the history 
of the Court's decisions in this field wherein the need for protecting 
municipal investments has time and again measured its strength with 
the exigencies of state sovereignty would appear to yield a caveat 
against too literal an interpretation of any one opinion so sweeping in 
82. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 690 (1897). See 
also Cincinnati v. Louisville etc. R. R., 223 U. S. 390 (1912). 
83. 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 896 (1936). 
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its terms. Let us consider briefly the role assumed by the Court in 
previous periods of municipal depression. 
Perhaps its most outstanding characteristic is the degree to which 
the Court ha$ in the past deemed itself justified under the Constitution 
to interfere in and override declared state policy and control over the 
fiscal affairs of local political subdivisions in order to protect the inter- 
ests of creditors. In the Iowa municipal railway aid bond cases, for 
example, although the state court, reversing an earlier decision, held that 
the legislature had had no power to authorize their issue and that they 
were utterly void, the United States Supreme Court held the bonds to 
be valid and enforceable against the municipalities and counties which 
issued them.' In Mobile v. Watson8 there was an involved and elab- 
orate attempt on the part of the state legislature to revoke the charter 
and dissolve a municipal debtor, setting up an arrangement whereby 
certain assets of the dissolved corporation would be applied on its debts 
and a settlement negotiated by a state agency with the creditors, and 
creating out of a major portion of the territory of the dissolved cor- 
poration an entirely new municipality, differently constituted, and with- 
out the same powers of taxation as the old. The Court did not hesitate 
to hold the new municipality responsible for the debts of the old, and 
empowered to levy such taxes as might have been levied by its prede- 
cessor for the purpose of their payment. In other cases state legisla- 
tures tried more simply to revise certain of the charter fiscal powers 
and practices of a debtor subdivision-as by the imposition of a new 
tax limitation or the revocation of power to levy any tax for debt serv- 
ice.80 Instances might be multiplied at great length, but suffice it to 
say that whenever such attempts were deemed by the Court substantially 
to impair the security of pre-existing contract obligations it did not 
hesitate to override such legislation, despite the circumstance that the 
prohibition embodied in the Constitution against state laws impairing 
the obligation of contracts does not specifically refer to contracts by 
political subdivisions of a state and might conceivably have been re- 
garded as impliedly limited by the sovereign prerogative of the states 
to control the creation, organization, powers and fiscal practices of their 
local political subdivisions. 
84. Gelpke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863); Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 
3 Wall. 294 (U. S. 1865); Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 (U.S. 1865); Rogers 
v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 (U.S. 1865); Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270 (U.S. 
1866); Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181 (U. S. 1868); Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 
575 (U.S. 1869). 
85. 116 U. S. 289 (1886). 
86. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U. S. 1866); Wolff v. New 
Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (1880). 
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In another class of cases we find the Court assuming the exercise of 
powers and functions ordinarily exercisable only by municipal officials 
under the charter mandate of a state legislature. Supervisors of Lee 
County v. Rogers, for example, was a case wherein the Court affirmed 
a power assumed by the trial court to order a United States marshal 
to levy and collect a tax for county debt service.87 The alleged authority 
for this unprecedented88 action was found in a state statute containing 
no special reference to cases involving counties or other local political 
subdivisions, but which, prescribing the state practice in connection with 
mandamus generally, simply provided that the state court "besides or in- 
stead of proceeding against the defendant by attachment, may direct 
that the act required to be done may be done by the plaintiff or some 
other person appointed by the court." In a more recent case there were 
involved some road district bonds secured by a mortgage on special 
assessments, levied by act of the legislature and payable in installments. 
A private banking institution was named trustee. State legislation au- 
thorizing the bond issue provided further -that in the event of default 
for thirty days the state chancery court should appoint a receiver to 
collect the assessments. The Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the lower federal court might by virtue of the aforesaid legislation 
appoint its own receiver at the suit of the trustee.8 
As summed up by Judge Dillon in the 1911 edition of his treatise: 
"The Supreme Court . . . has upheld the rights of the holders of 
municipal securities with a strong hand, and has set a face of flint against 
repudiation, even when made on legal grounds deemed solid by the State 
courts, as well as by the municipalities."90 The judicial machinery worked 
out by the Court during previous depressions was, as he suggests, pri- 
marily adapted to cases of what might be termed "wilful repudiation." 
Today we are for the most part concerned with the quite distinct problem 
of local government insolvency. But the line hewed by the Court in those 
earlier decisions lends corroboration to the contention made by the 
minority that "sufficient reasons do not appear for excluding political 
subdivisions from the bankruptcy jurisdiction if the jurisdiction is 
so exerted as to maintain the equilibrium between state and national 
power."01 
That Sections 78-80 of the Bankruptcy Act in the form in which 
they came before the Court were inadequately designed to achieve their 
87. 7 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1868). 
88. Cf. Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1873). 
89. Guardian Savings and Trust Co. v. Road Improvement District, 267 U. S. 1 
(1925). 
90. 2 DIuLoN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (5th ed. 1911) ? 886. 
91. 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 900 (1936). 
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declared objective has already been conceded. The circumstances under 
which readjustment negotiations were initiated and the plan prepared 
in the particular case which brought that legislation before the Court 
may well constitute an additional ground for distinguishing the Ashton 
decision in any future test of the validity of bankruptcy features in a 
more balanced and comprehensive scheme for municipal debt adjustment. 
It will be recalled that the debtor in the instant case sought a drastic 
scale-down of approximately fifty per cent. There was, moreover, a 
question of an R. F. C. loan to the district underlying the transaction, 
which is to say that the R.F.C. had, pursuant to statute92 appraised the 
property securing or underlying the outstanding bonds of the district 
and therefore had presumably arrived at this scale-down figure by its own 
computation. The special activities of the R.F.C. are thus another dis- 
tinguishing feature of the Ashton case; the statute governing the R. F. C. 
provides that: "No loan shall be made under this Section until the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (A) has caused an appraisal 
(B) has determined that the project of the applicant is eco- 
nomically sound and (C) has been satisfied that an agreement has been 
entered into between the applicant and holders of its outstanding bonds 
under which the applicant will be able to purchase or refund all 
or a major portion of such bonds or other obligations at a price de- 
termined by the Corporation to be reasonable . . . and under which a 
substantial reduction will be brought about in the amount of the out- 
standing indebtedness of the applicant." 93 There is the further con- 
sideration that the R. F. C. was drawn into this field of special district 
refinancing apparently as an incident to its efforts to refinance and sal- 
vage mortgage investments on private lands within such districts and 
that these latter securities are as a matter of law junior in their liens. 
Under all the circumstances of the case, emphasizing its facts and its 
background, it would surely be premature to assume that' the opinion of 
the majority in its literal entirety, as distinguished from the narrower 
ambit of what was necessarily decided, is to stand from now on as a 
complete bar to extension of the bankruptcy power in connection with 
local government insolvency. This contention is of course based upon 
the assumption that a local government unit can be "insolvent" in such 
a sense as to render bankruptcy legislation conceptually applicable. It is 
true that states have the power to devise systems of continuing super- 
vision and control over their political subdivisions to prevent the occur- 
rence of such a condition. Should default threaten, it is doubtless also 
within their power, though scarcely their practice, for the states to 
guarantee or assume obligations which a political subdivision cannot 
92. 48 STAT. 49, 308, 1110, 1269, 43 U. S. C. ? 403 (1934). 
93. Ibid. 
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meet. In that event there would be no default, or at least no continued 
default, and even if federal machinery for dealing with default existed 
there would be no occasion for its invocation. Perhaps that is the pos- 
sibility which those who refuse to concede the existence of municipal 
insolvency and who refuse to discuss anything but the terms of their 
bond have in mind. But we are referred to no legal means whereby 
either a municipal creditor, a debtor taxing district or a federal in- 
strumentality could force such a course upon a sovereign state; nor to 
any evidence pointing toward a voluntary assumption by the states of 
such complete responsibility for the debts of their local political sub- 
divisions. 
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